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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
section 22 of the Uniform Sales Act. In addition, this sec-
tion provides that until the condition is fulfilled the increase
of the goods shall remain the seller's property.
Section 29 states rules for cases not provided for pre-
viously in the Act and is closely analogous to section 63
of the Uniform Sales Act.
Section 30 provides that:
"This act shall be so interpreted and construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it".
All the uniform commercial acts contain this pro-
vision,4" the purpose of which is to lead Pennsylvania courts
in construing the Acts not only to follow Pennsylvania
precedents but also those of other jurisdictions.
There is no provision in the Pennsylvania Act provid-
ing for a repeal of prior inconsistent legislation correspond-
ing to section 32 of the commissioner's draft.48
Nicholas Unkovic
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES IN MURDER TRIALS
Since the Act of 1925, P. L. 759, the law in Pennsyl-
vania has been hazy and unsettled regarding the admission
of evidence of prior, unrelated crimes in the trial of a
specific offense. It has long been the established rule that
"evidence of unrelated crimes is not admissible in the trial
of a particular offense",' and this has been supported by
the Act of 1911, P. L. 20.2 As juries had been very re-
luctant to bring in a verdict of "guilty", with the death
4'Uniform Sales Act of May 19, 1915, sec. 74, P. L. 543; Uniform
Bills of Lading Act of June 9, 1911, sec. 52, P. L. 838; Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act of March 11, 1909, sec. 57, P. L. 19; Uniform
Stock Transfer Act of May 5, 1911, sec. 19, P. L. 126. See also Swift
v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1, 19, 20 (1842).
48See Section 32, 2 U. L. A. No. 32, p. 42.
'Wigmore on Evid., Vol. I, (Ed. II) Par. 193; Jamestown Iron &
Metal Co., v. Knofsky, 154 Atl. 15 (Pa. 1931); Comm. v. Jones, 280
Pa. 368 (1924); Comm. v. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1 (1898).
4Sec. 1, 19 P. S. sec. 711, p. 147.
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penalty attached automatically, in a case of first degree
murder, the Act of 1925, supra, was passed to give them
the power to determine the penalty for the defendant found
guilty by them. To aid them in this determination, evi-
dence of other crimes may be introduced. The earlier
cases decided after the passage of this Act, applied it so as
to nullify the Act of 1911, and if these are held to have
established the law since the Act, it might well be said
that, "The case of Comm. v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144 set out a
new exception to the general rule, applicable to a limited
number of cases; i. e., on a trial for first degree murder,
evidence of other unconnected crimes may be admitted so
that the jury might thereby be aided in pronouncing sent-
ence under the Act of May 24, 1925".A
Several cases, relying on Comm. v. Parker, subra, have
carried the admission of such evidence to the point of al-
lowing its use to help convict of the crime for which de-
fendant is then being tried. In Comm. v. Quaranta, Kep-
hart, J., said, "While defendant was on the stand, at his
counsel's request he admitted having been convicted of
certain other crimes; when cross-examined by the district
attorney, he was interrogated as to another crime for
which he had been convicted. This evidence was object-
ed to, first, because the Act of 1911 prevented it, the de-
fendant not having put his good character in evidence. De-
fendant assumed that if he shows a good character, minus
so much bad character, the Commonwealth is prevented
from proving still further bad character by showing as
false, his testimony in respect to other crimes committed.
Defendant voluntarily stepped outside the Act of 1911
when he narrated his criminal record, thus placing his
character in evidence. His true character as shown by the
conviction of an infamous offense, was proper in affecting
veracity, as well as proper cross-examination on his own
testimony". So it is seen that such evidence may be used
to impeach veracity of the defendant. In Comm. v. Melis-
3R. S. Machmer, 33 Dickinson Law Review, 244. (Under this
same title).
'295 Pa. 264.
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sari,' the defendant was not questioned about a former
crime or charge, but a witness testified that he had seen
the defendant in a police station, and this was competent
to prove the fact of the previous association with one
shown to have taken part in a previous murder, and de-
fendant's false denial of that important fact was held to
be proper for the consideration of the jury, in passing on
his guilt.6 The most recent case was Comm. v. Schroeder7
where the defendant had herself testified that she stole
"just to get a thrill out of it", and was "properly badged
by the medical experts as an 'habitual criminal'." Here,
the Court said, "In principle, we recognize the propriety
of testimony such as complained against in Comm. v.
Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535, and Coyle v. Comm., 104 Pa. 117.
Furthermore, it is admissible to give the jury light on the
matter of punishment, which is the problem they had to
solve. They had a right to know what kind of person she
really was"." Thus, while allowing the evidence to be used
according to the Act of 1925, this Court seems to go further
and allow it to be used as substantive evidence, as that was
the nature of the evidence complained of in the cases cited
above.
However, our Court, feeling perhaps, that the except-
ion, if carried too far, would create an extremely unpleas-
ant situation, held in Comm. v. Wdston9 that such proof
could not be received unless "it tends to establish guilt of
the defendant of the particular offense under consideration
of the jury", and continues to say that repetition of a vol-
untary confession made to police officers is not an attempt
on the part of the Commonwealth to prove a separate and
distinct crime.
But, the above references to the contrary notwith-
standing, there is a line of cases promulgating the general
'298 Pa. 63.
6Comm. v. Jones, 297 Pa. 326.
7152 At. 835, 302 Pa. 1, (1930).
$See, also:- Comm. v. Parker, supra; Comm. v. Mellor, 294 Pa.
339.
297 Pa. 382,
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doctrine of inadmissibility of such testimony as substantive
evidence, which is upheld by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania today. Despite the interpretation put on the case
of Comm. v. Parker, supra, we find the Court there following
the spirit of the Act of 1925 in these words: "Under the
section (of the Act) requiring the jury by its verdict to fix
the penalty of death or imprisonment for life at its dis-
cretion on conviction of first degree murder, evidence of the
defendant's confessions of other crimes than that charged
is admissible, especially when the entire defense is, in sub-
stance, a plea to the jury for mercy". This is closely fol-
lowed in Comm. v. Dague,1 ° and in Comm. v. Flood,1 where
the limitation on the exception to the general rule is em-
phatically stated thus: "While the statement in this case
might have militated against the defendant in a general
way, and without the Act of 1925 would have been im-
proper, it became material evidence as an aid to the jury
in determining the punishment to be inflicted, and in ascer-
taining whether the defendant is entitled to mercy. This
class of criminal cases must not be confused with the
authorities which exclude prior and subsequent acts as
substantive evidence of the commission of a crime. It is
here admitted for the sole purpose of enabling the jury
to properly administer the punishment, and the trial judge
should be very careful to explain and emphasize this limita-
tion in his charge to the jury".
It is rather strange that in Coinm. v. Luccitti,12 Kep-
hart, J., made no mention of the exception to the general
rule as set out in Comm. v. Parker, supra. In this case,
defendant was on trial for murder, and the Court says, on
page 196, "The general rule is that in a trial for a specific
offense, evidence cannot be offered of another distinct, in-
dependent and unrelated offense", and cites cases in sup-
port of this observation. But the Court goes on, "A dif-
ferent rule, however, must apply when the connection or
relation between the two crimes is manifest either frorrr
10152 Atd. 837, 302 Pa. 13, (1930).
"153 AtI. 152, 302 Pa. 190.
12295 Pa. 190.
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the crime itself, or from proofs in connection therewith".
Here, we find no consideration of the introduction of such
evidence for the purpose of aiding the jury in reaching a
determination of the penalty to be imposed, but rather,
the Court holds the evidence to be introduced strictly
within the confines of the general rule.
The majority of States today have enacted statutes
authorizing the tribunal to increase the sentence of one
whose offense, when established is found to be the second
or a later offense. Most of these, however, as well as the
English statutes, provide, or have been interpreted by their
respective Courts to mean, that such evidence of prior
convictions cannot be introduced until after the jury has
found the defendant guilty of the offense charged. But
some of these statutes, "apparently bound by the supposed
requirements of the unwise rule (existing in some juris-
dictions) which allows the jury to fix a criminal sentence,
permit the fact of prior convictions to be considered by the
jurors before the verdict." " The Pennsylvania statute (Act
of 1925, P. L. 759) is of this type. However, in Virginia,
in capital cases, prior convictions are not admissable under
,the statute."
From the cases here collected, it will be perceived that
although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has guarded
jealously the rights of the accused to have no evidence of
other crimes admitted as to help to determine him guilty
of the offense charged, by construing strictly the confines
under which such evidence shall be admitted under the
Act of 1925, they have, nevertheless, gone the limit under
this Act. The Courts having judicially noticed the class of
offenders known as "habitual criminals", have admitted
such testimony in the protection of society at large from
'3Wigmore on Evid., Vol. I, Par. 196 (2). See, also: 27 Harv.
L. R. 169; Hall v. Comm., 106 Ky. 894, 51 S. W. 804; People v. Mc-
Intyre, 163 N. Y. S. 528; Murby v. U. S., 2 Fed. (2nd) 56. Other
states having similar statutes are Illinois, Iowa, arid Maryland.
14Wright v. Comm., 109 Va. 847; 65 S. E. 19.
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this class of persons, at the risk of having such evidence
militate in a general way against the defendant.
Carol Macklem
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ARBITRATION ACT OF 1927
In Grote v. Stein,1 our Superior Court has displayed an
attitude which must surely distress those advocates of the
Arbitration Act of 1927,2 who had hoped for a broad con-
struction of the statute, remedial of many of the distinct-
ions and peculiarities of the former law.8
To understand the suggested disappointment, a brief
review of the status of arbitration agreements before the
Act of 1927 is necessary. A distinction had been made be-
tween agreements to arbitrate disputes which might arise
in the future and submission agreements of existing dis-
putes.
Of the former type, the courts early recognized that a
different rule should apply when a future dispute agree-
ment designated a named arbitrator or arbitrators from the
type of future dispute agreement in which the clause was
general and no arbitrator or arbitrators were chosen by
the parties. When arbitrators were named,' the agreement
was held to be irrevocable in two senses of the term, i. e.,
no action could be maintained on a cause of action em-
braced in the terms of the agreement, nor had the parties
power, by due notice of the revocation of authority prior to
the award, to prevent the binding effect of the award.
When arbitrators were not named,' the clause was held to be
general and, therefore, revocable in both senses above men-
199 Pa. Super. Ct. 556 (1930).
2P. L. 381.
8Anbitration Under the New Pennsylvania Statute, Wesley A.
Sturgis, 76 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 345 and following.
'Laurnan v. Young, 31 Pa. 306 (1858); Hartupee v. City of
Pittsburgh, 97 Pa. 107 (1881); Commonwealth v. Central Paving Com-
pany, 288 Pa. 571 (1927).
aSnodgrass v. Gavit, 28 Pa. 221 (1857); Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts
39 (1835); Gowan v. Pierson, 166 Pa. 258 (1895).
